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Abstract
Since the seminal work of Henderson (1981), a number of studies examined the eﬀect of staggered work hours by analyzing models
of work start time choice that consider the trade-oﬀ between negative congestion externalities and positive production externalities.
However, these studies described traﬃc congestion using ﬂow congestion models. This study develops a model of work start time
choice with bottleneck congestion and discloses the intrinsic properties of the model. To this end, this study extends Henderson’s
model to incorporate bottleneck congestion. By utilizing the properties of a potential game, we characterize equilibrium and
optimal distributions of work start times. We also show that Pigouvian tax/subsidy policies generally yield multiple equilibria
and that the ﬁrst-best optimum must be a stable equilibrium under Pigouvian policies, whereas the second-best optimum in which
policymakers cannot eliminate queuing congestion can be unstable.
c© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
Urban traﬃc congestion is caused by concentrated demand for travel around the start of the workday, because ﬁrms
in central business districts (CBDs) generally have ﬁxed work schedules and workers start work at the same time. In-
troducing staggered work hours (SWH) is a transportation demand management (TDM) measure for alleviating peak
congestion. It is widely recognized but rarely implemented, because it may reduce intra-ﬁrm communication and pro-
ductivity (Wilson, 1988). That is, SWH reduces positive production externalities (temporal agglomeration economies)
alongside the negative congestion externalities (temporal agglomeration diseconomies). Therefore, considering the
trade-oﬀ between congestion and productivity is essential when we examine the eﬀect of TDM measures for reducing
peak congestion.
Since the seminal work of Henderson (1981), a number of studies have developed models of work start time
choice that consider traﬃc congestion and productivity eﬀects; these studies will be discussed in Section 1.1. By
examining the equilibrium and optimal distributions of work start times and optimal congestion tolls, these studies
provide insights into TDM measures. However, analytical diﬃculties inevitably arising in models with agglomeration
economies and diseconomies (i.e., nonconvexities) limit these studies. Foremost among their limitations is that they
describe traﬃc congestion using ﬂow congestion models, which are inappropriate for dealing with peak congestion.
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Second, although their models have multiple equilibria, these studies address only a subset—e.g., cases where work
starting times are continuously distributed or completely clustered—and do not examine their stability. Therefore,
the equilibrium distribution of work start times may be unstable and may never emerge in their models. Third,
Akamatsu et al. (2014) shows that if we consider models with positive and negative externalities, social optima can
be unstable equilibria under Pigouvian policies, and a non-optimal stable equilibrium will exist. Therefore, although
previous studies (e.g., Arnott, 2007) investigate the properties of optimum congestion tolls, social optimum may not
be achieved under their congestion tolls.
This study shows that the potential function approach, which utilizes properties of a potential game, overcomes
these limitations and clariﬁes the intrinsic properties of a model of work start time choice with bottleneck congestion.
This paper ﬁrst develops a model with production eﬀects and bottleneck congestion by combining Henderson (1981)’s
model and the standard bottleneck model (Vickrey, 1969; Hendrickson and Kocur, 1981; Arnott et al., 1990). Similar
to models in Peer and Verhoef (2013) and Gubins and Verhoef (2014), ours assumes that workers make long-run
decisions about work start times and short-run decisions about day-speciﬁc work arrival times. In the short-run,
workers choose arrival times and take work start times as a given; in the long-run, they choose work start times
indirectly through their choice of employer. We then show that the short-run equilibrium is uniquely determined,
whereas the long-run equilibrium is not unique.
This study examines the local stability of long-run equilibrium by viewing it as a Nash equilibrium of a potential
game (Sandholm, 2001). The model of the long-run choice of work start time admits a potential function, and the set
of long-run equilibria coincides exactly with the set of Karush–Kuhn–Tucker points for the maximization problem of
the potential function. Further, all local maximizers of the potential function are locally stable long-run equilibria. We
can therefore characterize long-run equilibria and their stability by the shape of the potential function.
After characterizing the long-run equilibria and their stability, this study investigates the properties of the ﬁrst-best
and second-best optimal distributions of work start times and their stability under Pigouvian policies. The ﬁrst-best
optimum is deﬁned as the global maximizer of the social welfare function (workers’ total utility), and the second-best
optimum is that under the condition whereby policymakers cannot control workers’ short-run decisions; that is, the
queue at the bottleneck cannot be eliminated. Thus, diﬀerences between optimum and stable equilibria are clariﬁed
by comparing the shapes of the social welfare function and the potential function. Furthermore, stability of the ﬁrst-
best and second-best optima under Pigouvian policies is analyzed by the potential function approach. This analysis
discloses that the ﬁrst-best optimum must be a stable equilibrium under Pigouvian policies, whereas the second-best
optimum can be unstable.
1.1. Related Literature
Theoretical studies of SWH and its variants have appeared since the benchmark study by Henderson (1981). Hen-
derson (1981) assumed that all workers in a city commute from a common residential area to a common CBD along
a single congestible road and that the productivity of a worker at a point in time depends on the number of workers
at work at that time. These two assumptions yield both traﬃc congestion and productivity eﬀects in his model. He
then analyzed the equilibrium and optimal distributions of work start times. Wilson (1992) and Arnott et al. (2005)
extended Henderson (1981) by introducing workers’ choices of residential location and ﬁrm heterogeneity, respec-
tively. Arnott (2007) generalized Henderson’s model and analyzed optimal congestion tolls. Henderson (1981) and
these subsequent studies, however, described traﬃc congestion using a ﬂow congestion model.
Mun and Yonekawa (2006) and Fosgerau and Small (2014) were the most successful in considering both production
eﬀects and peak-period traﬃc congestion.1 Mun and Yonekawa (2006) formulated a peak-period congestion based
on the standard bottleneck model and developed a model that describes ﬁrms’ and workers’ choices to adopt ﬁxed or
ﬂextime schedules.2 They showed that a situation in which all ﬁrms adopt ﬂextime never emerges as equilibrium and
that multiple equilibria could exist. However, due to analytical diﬃculties, they examined the stability of equilibria
only by numerical examples.
1 Sato and Akamatsu (2006) also extended the standard bottleneck model to incorporate the productivity eﬀect. Although they provided a rigorous
framework, their analysis was limited to a particular set of equilibria, such as cases where work start times are completely clustered and staggered.
2 Yoshimura and Okumura (2001) proposed a similar model and numerically examined the optimal distribution of work start times.
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Fig. 1. The monocentric city
Fosgerau and Small (2014) presented a model that introduces bottleneck congestion and productivity eﬀects of
work and leisure. They investigated the properties of optimal tolls. However, their model presupposed that all workers
determine their own work start time, which implies that all ﬁrms adopt ﬂextime. This leads to the result that workers’
work start times are the same as their arrival times at the CBD. Thus, their model describes only a situation wherein
work start times are continuously distributed. Furthermore, they did not examine the uniqueness and stability of
equilibrium.
It is noteworthy that the framework of Henderson (1981) is the same as that of social interaction models (e.g.,
Beckmann, 1976; Tabuchi, 1986), which study spatial agglomeration of economic activities. Beckmann (1976) led
to numerous extensions and modiﬁcations (Fujita and Ogawa, 1982; Fujita, 1988; Berliant et al., 2002; Mossay and
Picard, 2011; Akamatsu et al., 2015) that provide approaches for characterizing equilibrium and social optimum.3 This
study modiﬁes one of these approaches—the potential function approach4 in Akamatsu et al. (2015)—and applies it
to the model featuring bottleneck congestion. This approach signiﬁcantly simpliﬁes characterizing equilibrium, its
stability, and optimum of our model. By applying the potential function approach, this study then analytically clariﬁes
the intrinsic properties of the model featuring production eﬀects and bottleneck congestion.
This study proceeds as follows. Section 2 formulates a model of work start time choice featuring bottleneck
congestion and production eﬀects. Section 3 describes the long-run choice of work start time as a potential game and
investigates the uniqueness and stability of the short-run and long-run equilibria by the potential function approach.
Section 4 examines the properties of ﬁrst-best and second-best optima and their stability under Pigouvian policies.
Section 5 concludes. Proofs omitted in the text are in the Appendix.
2. The Model
2.1. Basic assumptions
Consider a city that consists of a CBD and a residential area connected by a single road (Figure 1). This road
has a single bottleneck with capacity μ. All workers reside in the residential area and commute to the CBD, where
all ﬁrms are located. If arrival rates of workers at the bottleneck exceed its capacity, a queue develops. To model
queuing congestion, we employ ﬁrst-in-ﬁrst-out (FIFO) and a point queue in which vehicles have no physical length
as in standard bottleneck models (e.g., Vickrey, 1969; Hendrickson and Kocur, 1981; Arnott et al., 1990, 1993).
Each ﬁrm chooses its work start time from the feasible set {t1, t2, · · · , tT }, where ti = ti−1 + τ for all i ∈ {2, 3, · · · , T }
and τ is a positive constant. Since the length of a workday is assumed to be identical and ﬁxed at H for all ﬁrms, each
ﬁrm is characterized by its work start time. For convenience, we call the ﬁrm that starts work at time ti “ﬁrm i.” We
further assume there is an interval in the workday when all ﬁrms begin work, i.e., tT < t1 + H.
2.1.1. Behavior of workers
The N workers are ex ante identical. Each chooses his or her work start time ti indirectly by choosing an employer
(i.e., a ﬁrm i ∈ I ≡ {1, 2, · · · , T } to work for) and the departure time t at the bottleneck to maximize utility ui(t). The
utility of a worker who starts work at ti, whom we call “worker i,” is given by
ui(t) = wi − ci(t), (1)
3 For comprehensive reviews of these literature, see Fujita and Thisse (2013).
4 Methods that utilize the potential function are found in a diverse range of applications (for reviews, see, e.g., Sandholm, 2010), which includes
transportation science (e.g., Beckmann et al., 1956; Rosenthal, 1973; Sandholm, 2002).
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where wi denotes the wage from ﬁrm i and ci(t) denotes commuting cost. The commuting cost ci(t) of worker i who
departs the bottleneck at time t is expressed as the sum of queuing time cost at the bottleneck, q(t), schedule delay
cost, s(t − ti), and ﬁxed travel time cost, c f :
ci(t) = q(t) + s(t − ti) + c f . (2)
We assume that s(x) is diﬀerentiable, strictly convex, and strictly minimized at x = 0, and that s′(x) ≡ ds(x)/dx > −1
as in Daganzo (1985), Kuwahara (1990), and Lindsey (2004). Following Arnott et al. (1990, 1993), we set c f = 0 and
s(0) = 0 without aﬀecting the results of interest.
We consider utility maximization as a sequence of short-run and long-run optimizations. Speciﬁcally, workers in
the short-run minimize commuting cost ci(t) = q(t)+ s(t− ti) by selecting their departure time t taking work start time
ti as given:
min
t
ci(t) = q(t) + s(t − ti). (3)
In the long-run, each worker chooses an employer so as to maximize his/her utility:
max
i
ui = wi − c∗i , (4)
where c∗i is the short-run equilibrium commuting cost of worker i, determined by his/her short-run decisions.
2.1.2. Behavior of Firms
All ﬁrms produce homogeneous goods under constant returns to scale technology and perfect competition, which
requires one unit of labor to produce one unit of output and is chosen as nume´raire. For introduction of the production
eﬀect, this model assumes that the productivity per worker of a ﬁrm at time t is linearly increasing with the total num-
ber of workers then on duty in all ﬁrms together. This production eﬀect is represented by the following instantaneous
production function:
f (t) = αN(t), (5)
where α > 0 is constant parameter and N(t) is the total number of workers on duty at time t. The daily output Fi per
worker of a ﬁrm i is simply the sum over the workday of the instantaneous output f (t):
Fi =
∫ ti+H
ti
f (t)dt =
∫ ti+H
ti
αN(t)dt. (6)
Note that because ti = ti−1 + τ, N(t) is represented as follows (Figure 2):
N(t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∑ j
k=1 Nk if t ∈ [t j, t j+1) ∀ j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , T − 1},
N if t ∈ [tT , t1 + H],∑T
k= j+1 Nk if t ∈ (t j + H, t j+1 + H] ∀ j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , T − 1},
(7)
where Ni denotes total number of workers employed by ﬁrm i. Under the production function deﬁned in (6), each ﬁrm
chooses its work start time to maximize proﬁt per worker:
max
i
πi = Fi − wi. (8)
Since a ﬁrm cannot change its work start time frequently, its choice of work start time is assumed to be a long-run
decision.
2.2. Short-run and long-run equilibrium conditions
2.2.1. Short-run equilibrium conditions
In the short-run, workers decide only the day-speciﬁc departure time t at the bottleneck, which implies that the
number of workers N = (Ni)i∈I employed by ﬁrm i ∈ I—which we call the distributions of work start times—is
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Fig. 2. Total number of workers on duty
assumed to be given. Therefore, short-run equilibrium conditions coincide with those of the standard bottleneck
model, given by these three conditions:⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩c
∗
i −
{
q(t) + s(t − ti)} = 0 if ni(t) > 0
c∗i −
{
q(t) + s(t − ti)} ≤ 0 if ni(t) = 0 ∀t, ∀i ∈ I, (9a)⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩μ −
∑
k nk(t) = 0 if q(t) > 0
μ −∑k nk(t) ≥ 0 if q(t) = 0 ∀t, (9b)∫
ni(t)dt = Ni ∀i ∈ I, (9c)
where ni(t) is the number of workers i who arrive at the CBD at time t (i.e., the arrival rate of workers i at the CBD).
Condition (9a) represents the no-arbitrage condition for the choice of departure time. This condition means that
at the short-run equilibrium, no worker can reduce commuting cost by changing arrival time at the CBD unilaterally.
Condition (9b) is the capacity constraint of the bottleneck, which requires that the total departure rate
∑
k nk(t) at the
bottleneck is equal to the capacity μ if there is a queue; otherwise, the total departure rate is (weakly) lower than
μ. The last condition (9c) is ﬂow conservation for commuting demand. These conditions give ni(t), q(t), and c∗i at
short-run equilibrium as functions of the distribution of work start times, N.
2.2.2. Long-run equilibrium conditions
In the long-run, each worker chooses an employer, and each ﬁrm chooses its work start time. Thus, the long-run
equilibrium conditions are represented as⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩u
∗ − {wi − c∗i } = 0 if Ni > 0
u∗ − {wi − c∗i } ≥ 0 if Ni = 0 ∀i ∈ I, (10a)⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩π
∗ − {Fi − wi} = 0 if Ni > 0
π∗ − {Fi − wi} ≥ 0 if Ni = 0 ∀i ∈ I, (10b)∑
k
Nk = N, (10c)
where u∗ denotes the equilibrium utility, and π∗ is the equilibrium proﬁt which equals zero because ﬁrms in the city
are perfectly competitive.
Conditions (10a) and (10b) are the equilibrium conditions for workers’ choice of ﬁrm and ﬁrms’ choice of work
start time, respectively. Condition (10a) implies that at long-run equilibrium, each worker has no incentive to change
employer unilaterally. Condition (10b) means that if workers are employed by ﬁrm i, the ﬁrm i earns the equilibrium
proﬁt π∗ = 0; otherwise, the proﬁt must be less than zero. Condition (10b) is the conservation law of the population
of workers.
We easily show that conditions (10a) and (10b) are rewritten as the following condition because π∗ = 0.⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩u
∗ − {Fi(N) − c∗i (N)} = 0 if Ni > 0
u∗ − {Fi(N) − c∗i (N)} ≥ 0 if Ni = 0 ∀i ∈ I, (11)
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where Fi(N) and c∗i (N) are determined by (6) and (9) as functions of the distribution N of work start times. Therefore,
the long-run equilibrium distribution N∗ of work start times and utility u∗ are obtained from conditions (10c) and (11).
3. Short-run and Long-run Equilibrium
3.1. Short-run equilibrium
We ﬁrst characterize short-run equilibrium. Since we assume that the schedule delay cost function s(x) is diﬀeren-
tiable, strictly convex, and strictly minimized at x = 0, and that s′(x) > −1, the following proposition is obtained.
Proposition 1. The short-run equilibrium is uniquely determined. Furthermore, workers arrive at and leave a bottle-
neck in the same order as their work start times. That is, the ﬁrst-in-ﬁrst-work discipline is valid.
Proof. See Smith (1984), Daganzo (1985), Kuwahara (1990), and Lindsey (2004).
In addition, short-run equilibrium commuting cost c∗i (N) has the following desirable properties, which are useful
for investigating the properties of long-run equilibrium.
Lemma 1. The Jacobian matrix ∇c(N) of the short-run equilibrium commuting cost c(N) = (c∗i (N))i∈I is symmetric
and positive semideﬁnite.
Proof. See Appendix.
3.2. Long-run equilibrium
3.2.1. Potential game
We next characterize long-run equilibrium. For the analysis, we invoke the properties of a potential game intro-
duced by Monderer and Shapley (1996) and Sandholm (2001). Because the long-run equilibrium conditions are repre-
sented by (10c) and (11), the model of workers’ long-run choice of work start time can be viewed as a population game
in which the set of players isS ≡ [0,N], the common action set isI, and the payoﬀ vector is u(N) = (Fi(N)−c∗i (N))i∈I.
As is evident from the deﬁnition, a long-run equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of the game. Thus, let us denote this
game by G = {S,I, u}.
A potential game is deﬁned as a game G that holds the following condition: there exists a continuously diﬀeren-
tiable function P such that
∂P(N)
∂Ni
= ui(N) ∀N ∈ Δ ≡
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩N ∈ RT+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
k
Nk = N
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ , ∀i ∈ I, (12)
where P is deﬁned on an open set containing Δ so that its partial derivative is well-deﬁned on Δ. The function P is
the potential function of the game G. This condition requires the existence of a function in which gradient ∇P(N)
equals the payoﬀ vector u. As Sandholm (2001) proves, if payoﬀs u(N) are continuously diﬀerentiable, this condition
is equivalent to the following condition called externality symmetry:
∂ui(N)
∂Nj
=
∂u j(N)
∂Ni
∀N ∈ Δ, ∀i, j ∈ I. (13)
We now show that our game G is a potential game. It follows from (6) that the payoﬀ vector u(N) is represented as
u(N) = F(N) − c(N) = α {HE − τD} N − c(N), (14)
where E is T × T matrix with all elements equal to 1, and D is the symmetric Toeplitz matrix whose (i, j) element is
given by |i − j|. From this and Lemma 1, the Jacobian matrix ∇u(N) of the payoﬀ vector u(N) is symmetric, which
implies that externality symmetry holds in our game. Therefore, we have the following proposition.
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Proposition 2. The game G is a potential game with the potential function
P(N) = P1(N) − P2(N), (15a)
where P1(N) and P2(N) are convex functions such that
∇P1(N) = F(N), ∇P2(N) = c(N). (15b)
Proof. See Appendix.
It follows from Fi(N) = α
∑
k∈I{H − τ|i − k|}Nk that P1 is given by
P1 =
1
2
∑
k∈I
Fk(N)Nk. (16)
The equilibrium of a potential game is characterized with the maximization problem of the potential function. Let
us consider the following problem:
max
N
P(N) s.t.
∑
k∈I
Nk = N, Ni ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I. (17)
Let u∗ be a Lagrange multiplier for the constraint
∑
k Nk = N. We then can readily verify that the Karush–Kuhn–
Tucker (KKT) conditions of this problem are equivalent to long-run equilibrium conditions (10c) and (11). Therefore,
the equilibrium set of the game G exactly coincides with the set of KKT points for problem (17).
From problem (17), we recognize the trade-oﬀ between positive production externalities (temporal agglomeration
economies) and negative congestion externalities (temporal agglomeration diseconomies) as the trade-oﬀ between the
convexity of P1(N) and concavity of −P2(N). If the concavity of −P2(N) dominates such that P(N) is strictly concave,
a staggered work hours equilibrium is attained as a unique equilibrium. On the other hand, if the convexity of P1(N)
dominates, the equilibrium distributions of work start times would be more clustered. Therefore, P1(N) represents
positive production externalities, whereas −P2(N) represents negative congestion externalities.
This fact suggests that the capacity expansion of the bottleneck may worsen traﬃc congestion in our model. The
mechanism is as follows. The capacity expansion decreases commuting costs, and thus −P2(N) will be less dominant.
This may lead to more clustered distribution of work start times, thereby exacerbating the bottleneck congestion. Al-
though this result does not always arise in our model, we can show that such a situation actually exists, as discussed in
Section 3.2.4. In addition, since temporal agglomeration increases the total output
∑
i NiFi(N) but does not necessarily
increase the output Fi(N) of all ﬁrms, only certain ﬁrms beneﬁt from the capacity expansion.
3.2.2. Uniqueness
To characterize the long-run equilibrium, we ﬁrst examine its uniqueness. Since the KKT points of problem (17)
are long-run equilibrium, the uniqueness can be investigated by checking the shape of the potential function P(N).
Speciﬁcally, if P(N) is unimodal, the long-run equilibrium is unique; otherwise, it is non-unique. It follows from
Proposition 1 that P(N) is not generally unimodal because of the convexity of P1(N). Thus, we have
Lemma 2. The long-run equilibrium is generally not unique.
It is noteworthy that Lemma 2 does not suggest essential multiplicity of equilibria because even if all of the equilib-
rium distributions of work start times are essentially the same (e.g., completely clustered distributions: (N, 0, · · · , 0),
(0,N, · · · , 0), (0, 0, · · · ,N)), the number of equilibria is not one. Hence, we next investigate the essential unique-
ness of the long-run equilibrium. For the investigation, we show a property of the support supp N∗ ≡ {i ∈ I | Ni > 0}
of the long-run equilibrium.
Lemma 3. Suppose N∗ ∈ Δ is a long-run equilibrium. Then, supp N∗ ∈ SC where
SC =
{
{i1, i2, · · · , ia} ⊆ I | a ∈ I, i j+1 = i j + 1 ∀ j ∈ [1, a − 1],
}
. (18)
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Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 3 means that the set of work start times such that Ni > 0 is a convex set. In other words, if we suppose τ = 30
(min) and some employees start work at 8:00 and 9:00, there must be workers who start at 8:30.
Because of the symmetry of our model, Lemma 3 implies that if the long-run equilibrium N∗ is not full support
(i.e., supp N∗  I) and N1 = 0, there is a long-run equilibrium Nˆ∗ that is essentially the same with N∗ such that
Nˆ∗ = RˆN∗, (19)
where Rˆ = (Rˆi j)i, j∈I is the T × T permutation matrix given by
Rˆi j =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩1 if j − i = 1 or j − i = 1 − T,0 otherwise, (20)
that is, Nˆ∗i = N
∗
i+1 for all i ∈ I\{T } and Nˆ∗T = 0. Furthermore, if we deﬁne the schedule delay cost function s(x) such
that s(x) = s(−x), there also exists essentially the same long-run equilibrium N˜∗ with N∗ such that
N˜∗ = R˜N∗, (21)
where R˜ = (R˜i j)i, j∈I is the T × T permutation which acts as the upside-down reﬂection given by
R˜i j =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩1 if i + j = T + 1,0 otherwise. (22)
The essentially identical long-run equilibria N∗, Nˆ∗, N˜∗ satisfy
P(N∗) = P(Nˆ∗) = P(N˜∗), (23a)
det(∇2P(N∗)) = det(∇2P(Nˆ∗)) = det(∇2P(N˜∗)), (23b)
where ∇2P(N∗) is the Hessian matrix of P at N∗ and det(A) is the determinant of A. Moreover, from the index theorem
of Simsek et al. (2007), the set KKT(P,Δ) of the KKT points of problem (17) (i.e., the set of the long-run equilibria)
satisﬁes ∑
N∈KKT(P,Δ)
indP(N) = 1, (24a)
indP(N) ≡
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
−1 if det(∇2P(N)) < 0,
0 if det(∇2P(N)) = 0,
1 if det(∇2P(N)) > 0.
(24b)
However, the total value of indices of essentially the same long-run equilibria cannot be one because of (23b). There-
fore, we can obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The long-run equilibrium is essentially non-unique.
3.2.3. Stability
We next consider the local asymptotic stability of long-run equilibria because our model generally includes multiple
equilibria as shown above. To investigate the stability of the long-run equilibrium, we need to assume adjustment
dynamics N˙ = V(N) that maps a distribution of work start times N0 ∈ Δ to a set of Lipschitz paths in Δ that
starts from N0. Although we usually consider a speciﬁc evolutionary dynamic for stability analysis, we see that a
more general analysis is possible due to the existence of a potential function. That is, the stability of equilibria can
be characterized under a broad class of dynamics. In particular, we consider the class of admissible dynamics that
satisﬁes the following conditions:
V(N) · u(N) > 0 whenever V  0, (25a)
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V(N) = 0 implies that N is a Nash equilibrium of the game G. (25b)
The former condition (25a), called positive correlation, requires that out of rest points, there is a positive correlation
between the adjustment dynamics V(N) and the payoﬀs u(N). This implies that, under this condition, all Nash
equilibria of the game G are rest points of the adjustment dynamics V(N).5 The latter condition (25b), called Nash
stationarity, asks that every rest points of the adjustment dynamics V(N) be a Nash equilibrium of the game G.
Therefore, under the conditions (25a) and (25b), N˙ = V(N) = 0 if and only if N is a Nash equilibrium of the game G.
Speciﬁc examples of admissible dynamics include the best response dynamic (Gilboa and Matsui, 1991), the Brown–
von Neumann–Nash dynamic (Brown and von Neumann, 1950), and projection dynamic (Dupuis and Nagurney,
1993).6
Under the admissible dynamics, we can easily characterize the local asymptotic stability of Nash equilibria of a
potential game because Sandholm (2001) proves that a Nash equilibrium of a potential game is asymptotically stable
under any admissible dynamics if and only if it locally maximizes an associated potential function. This implies
that we can examine the stability of long-run equilibria only by checking the shape of the potential function. The
following section compares the stable long-run equilibrium and optimal distributions of work start times by utilizing
this property.
3.2.4. A simple example
To demonstrate the usefulness of the potential function approach and to show the properties of the long-run equi-
librium of our model, we analyze the model under the simple setting such that T = 2, s(x) = βx2 where β is a positive
constant. In this setting, the FIFO principle is satisﬁed (i.e., vehicles must leave the bottleneck in the same order as
the order of arrivals at the bottleneck) at the short-run equilibrium if βN ≤ μ. Thus, we suppose that parameters μ,N, β
satisfy this condition in this example.
In the case that T = 2, the distribution of work start times can be classiﬁed into three patterns (Figure 3):7
Pattern 1: work start times are completely clustered.
Pattern 2.1: work start times are staggered, and the rush hour in which queuing congestion occurs is a single interval.
Pattern 2.2: work start times are staggered, and the rush hour is divided into two intervals.
Because of s(x) = s(−x) in this example, Pattern 2.1 arises only if τ ≤ N/(2μ), and Pattern 2.2 arises only if τ >
N/(2μ).
The short-run equilibrium commuting costs c∗1(N1) and c
∗
2(N1) are obtained as functions of N1:
c∗1(N1) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
β
(
N
2μ
− τN − N1
N
)2
if τ ≤ N
2μ
,
β
4μ2
N21 if τ >
N
2μ
,
c∗2(N1) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
β
(
N
2μ
− τN1
N
)2
if τ ≤ N
2μ
,
β
4μ2
(N − N1)2 if τ > N2μ .
(26)
Therefore, the potential function is represented as
P(N1) = P1(N1) − P2(N1), (27a)
P1(N1) = α
{
HN2
2
− τN1(N − N1)
}
, (27b)
P2(N1) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
βN3
12μ2
+ βτ
(
τ
N
− 1
μ
)
N1(N − N1) if τ ≤ N2μ ,
βN
12μ2
{
N2 − 3N1(N − N1)
}
if τ >
N
2μ
.
(27c)
5 See Proposition 4.3 of Sandholm (2001).
6 The replicator dynamic (Taylor and Jonker, 1978) also satisﬁes (25) in the interior of Δ. For more examples, see Sandholm (2005a).
7 Note that the arrivals at the bottleneck of workers for diﬀerent ﬁrms are not interlaced as shown in Proposition 1.
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(c) Pattern 2.2
Fig. 3. Distributions of work start times
Because the potential function is quadratic and the second derivative of the potential function is given by
∂2P(N1)
∂N21
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
2τ
{
α + β
(
τ
N
− 1
μ
)}
if τ ≤ N
2μ
,
2
(
ατ − βN
4μ2
)
if τ >
N
2μ
,
(28)
the stable and unstable long-run equilibria Ns1,N
u
1 are obtained as follows:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Ns1 = 0,N, N
u
1 =
N
2
if
{
τ > βN4αμ2 and τ >
N
2μ
}
or
{
τ > N
(
1
μ
− α
β
)
and τ ≤ N2μ
}
,
Ns1 =
N
2
if
{
τ ≤ βN4αμ2 and τ > N2μ
}
or
{
τ ≤ N
(
1
μ
− α
β
)
and τ ≤ N2μ
}
.
(29)
Figure 4 illustrates the relation between the stable equilibrium and parameters τ and μ when α = 0.2, β = 1.0, and
N = 1.0.
We next show there is a situation in which capacity expansion exacerbates traﬃc congestion. We consider the case
that capacity μ is expanded to 1.5μ and the stable equilibrium changes from Pattern 2.2 to Pattern 1 as illustrated in
Figure 4. In this case, the total queuing time costs before and after the capacity expansion Qb,Qa are given by
Qb =
∫ tl1
t f1
n1(t) q(t)dt +
∫ tl2
t f2
n2(t) q(t)dt = μ
∫ tl1
t f1
c∗1 − s(t − t1)dt + μ
∫ tl2
t f2
c∗2 − s(t − t2)dt
=
{
N1c∗1 + N2c
∗
2
} − 2μβ
3
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
(
N1
2μ
)3
+
(
N − N1
2μ
)3⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ = 8μβ3
(
N
4μ
)3
, (30a)
Qa =
∫ tli
t fi
ni(t) q(t)dt = 1.5μ
∫ tli
t fi
c∗i − s(t − ti)dt = Nc∗i − μβ
(
N
3μ
)3
= 3μβ
(
N
3μ
)3
, (30b)
where t fi and t
l
i are the fastest and latest arrival time at the CBD of worker i. This result clearly indicates that Q
b < Qa.
That is, the capacity expansion exacerbates traﬃc congestion.
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Fig. 4. Parameters and the stable equilibrium (N = 1.0, α = 0.2, β = 1.0)
4. Social Optimum
Because of the positive and negative externalities, the long-run equilibrium is not generally eﬃcient. Therefore,
this section discusses TDM policies such as SWH and taxation for achieving the optimal distribution of work start
times. To address this issue, we ﬁrst characterize the social (i.e., ﬁrst-best) optimum and the second-best optimum
in which policymakers cannot control workers’ short-run decisions. That is, the queue at the bottleneck cannot be
eliminated. We then analyze the eﬀectiveness of Pigouvian policies for achieving ﬁrst-best and second-best optima.
4.1. First-best optimum
We deﬁne the ﬁrst-best optimum as a state wherein total utility is maximized. This means that the ﬁrst-best
optimum coincides with a solution of the following maximization problem:
max
{ni(t)},N
W = W1(N) −W2({ni(t)}) (31a)
s.t. μ −
∑
k∈I
nk(t) ≥ 0 ∀t,
∫
ni(t)dt = Ni ∀i ∈ I, ni(t) ≥ 0 ∀t, ∀i ∈ I, (31b)
N ∈ Δ, (31c)
where W1 denotes workers’ total wages in the city and W2 is total commuting cost, which are given by
W1(N) =
∑
k∈I
Fk(N)Nk = 2P1(N), (31d)
W2({ni(t)}) =
∑
k∈I
∫
nk(t) {q(t) + s(t − tk)} dt. (31e)
As is the case with P1 and P2, W1 and W2 represent the strength of positive production externalities and negative
congestion externalities, respectively.
The queue at the bottleneck is completely eliminated at the ﬁrst-best optimum as proved in studies involving
standard bottleneck models (e.g., Vickrey, 1969; Hendrickson and Kocur, 1981; Arnott et al., 1990, 1993, 1994). It
follows from this that W2({ni(t)}) can be rewritten as
W˜2({ni(t)}) =
∑
k∈I
∫
nk(t) s(t − tk)dt, (32)
which denotes the total schedule delay costs in the city. It is noteworthy that W˜2({ni(t)}) coincides with the objec-
tive function of the optimization problem that is equivalent to the equilibrium conditions of the standard bottleneck
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model (Iryo and Yoshii, 2007). Speciﬁcally, we obtain {ni(t)} at the short-run equilibrium by solving the following
minimization problem:
min
{ni(t)}
W˜2({ni(t)}) s.t. (31b) (33)
Furthermore, this problem has the following useful property:
Lemma 4. Z(N) = min{ni(t)} W˜2({ni(t)}) s.t. (31b) satisﬁes
∇Z(N) = c(N). (34)
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 4 indicates that P2(N) is given by Z(N). Therefore the distribution No of work start times at the ﬁrst-best
optimum is the solution of the following problem.
Lemma 5. The distribution No of work start times at the ﬁrst-best optimum is obtained by solving the following
maximization problem.
max
N
P(N) + P1(N) s.t. N ∈ Δ. (35)
Lemma 5 implies that the positive production externalities should be strengthened (i.e., the distribution of work start
times should be clustered) to achieve the ﬁrst-best optimum because the objective function of problem (35) is the sum
of the potential function P(N) and the convex function P1(N), which represents the production externalities. This is
due to the fact that the queue at the bottleneck can be eliminated (i.e., the negative congestion externalities can be
internalized) without changing the distribution of work start times. Therefore, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4. The ﬁrst-best optimal distribution No of work start times is more clustered than the stable equilibrium
Ns.
4.2. Second-best optimum
Although there are numerous eﬀective schemes for managing traﬃc congestion, including dynamic congestion
pricing (e.g., Yang and Huang, 2005; Tsekeris and Voß, 2008; de Palma and Lindsey, 2011) and tradable permits
schemes (e.g., Verhoef et al., 1997; Yang and Wang, 2011; Wada and Akamatsu, 2013), eliminating queuing conges-
tion has been diﬃcult thus far. Thus, we next consider the second-best optimum wherein policymakers cannot control
workers’ short-run behaviors. That is, the queue at the bottleneck cannot be eliminated. The distribution Nˆo of work
start times at the second-best optimum is deﬁned as the solution of the following problem:
max
N
Wˆ(N) = Wˆ1(N) − Wˆ2(N) s.t. N ∈ Δ, (36a)
where Wˆ1(N) and Wˆ2(N) are total wage and commuting cost, respectively, which are expressed as
Wˆ1(N) = W1(N) =
∑
k∈I
Fk(N)Nk, (36b)
Wˆ2(N) =
∑
k∈I
c∗k(N)Nk. (36c)
To compare the second-best optimum and the stable equilibrium, we examine the shape of Wˆ(N) from its Hessian
matrix. Because the Hessian matrix of Wˆ(N) is given by
∇2Wˆ(N) = 2∇2P(N) −
∑
k∈I
Nk∇2c∗k(N), (37)
we see that only −∑k∈I Nk∇2c∗k(N) makes a diﬀerence in the shape of Wˆ(N) and P(N). This yields the following
proposition.
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Proposition 5. The second-best optimal distribution of work start times is more clustered than the stable equilib-
rium if the matrix −∑k∈I Nk∇2c∗k(N) is positive deﬁnite, and it is more staggered than the stable equilibrium if−∑k∈I Nk∇2c∗k(N) is negative deﬁnite.
Note here that in many cases −∑k∈I Nk∇2c∗k(N) is expected to be negative deﬁnite because the schedule delay cost
function s(x) is assumed to be convex. In fact, if the number of intervals of rush hour at the second-best optimum
equals the cardinality of supp Nˆo (i.e., rush hour is completely separated), c∗i (N) must be convex due to the convexity
of s(x). Therefore, Nˆo is generally expected to be more staggered than Ns, which implies that the TDM policies for
staggering work hours are generally eﬀective in the case where queuing congestion cannot be eliminated.
4.3. Pigouvian policies
We next discuss tax/subsidy policies that attain the ﬁrst-best and second-best optima as a stable long-run equilibria.
To achieve the optimum, we generally consider Pigouvian policies, such as congestion tolls. We do so because the op-
timal state is supported as an equilibrium by imposing such policies that workers are responsible for their externalities
at the optimum. However, as mentioned in the introduction, Akamatsu et al. (2014) shows that if we consider a model
with positive and negative externalities, social optimum can be an unstable equilibrium under Pigouvian policies and
a non-optimal stable equilibrium will exist. This implies the possibility that the social optimum cannot be achieved
only by Pigouvian policies in our model. Therefore, this section analyzes the stability of the ﬁrst-best and second-best
optima under Pigouvian policies.
4.3.1. First-best optimum
Since the model of workers’ short-run decisions involves no positive externalities, we assume the queue is com-
pletely eliminated by some schemes and examine whether the ﬁrst-best optimal distribution of work start times is
a stable long-run equilibrium under Pigouvian policies. We consider a Pigouvian policy that introduces tax/subsidy
p = (pi)i∈I to workers in order to attain the ﬁrst-best optimum, which we call the Pigouvian ﬁrst-best policy. It follows
from Proposition 2 and Lemma 5 that p is given by
p = F(No) = α {HE − τD} No. (38)
Under the Pigouvian ﬁrst-best policy, our model is viewed as a potential game GP = {S,I, uP}, where uP(N) =
u(N) + p, because there exists the following potential function:
PP(N) = P(N) + p · N. (39)
The KKT conditions of the maximization problem of the potential function PP(N) subject to N ∈ Δ is given by⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩u
∗ − {Fi(No) + Fi(N) − c∗i (N)} = 0 if Ni > 0
u∗ − {Fi(No) + Fi(N) − c∗i (N)} ≥ 0 if Ni = 0 ∀i ∈ I, (40a)∑
k∈I
Nk = N. (40b)
This implies that the ﬁrst-best optimum No must be a Nash equilibrium of the game GP because the ﬁrst-order
conditions (i.e., optimality conditions) of problem (35) is represented as⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩w
∗ − {2Fi(N) − c∗i (N)} = 0 if Ni > 0
w∗ − {2Fi(N) − c∗i (N)} ≥ 0 if Ni = 0 ∀i ∈ I, (41a)∑
k∈I
Nk = N. (41b)
However, this policy does not work for stabilizing the ﬁrst-best optimum because introduction of the Pigouvian ﬁrst-
best policy cannot change the Hessian matrix of the potential function. That is, ∇2P(N) equals ∇2PP(N). Note that
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because ∇2P(N) = ∇2PP(N), No is stable under the Pigouvian ﬁrst-best policy when No = Ns, and No is unstable if
No = Nu.
Since P is not generally unimodal, the equilibrium of the game GP is generally non-unique. Thus, we examine the
stability of the ﬁrst-best optimum No by looking at the shape of PP at No. No is locally and asymptotically stable
(i.e., a local maximizer of PP) if and only if
(N − No)
{
∇2PP(No)
}
(N − No) < 0 ∀N ∈ Δ\{No}; (42)
otherwise, No is unstable. Because No is the global maximizer of W and ∇2P1(N) is positive deﬁnite, we have
0 > (N − No)∇2W(No)(N − No) = (N − No)
{
∇2P(No) + ∇2P1(No)
}
(N − No)
> (N − No)∇2P(No)(N − No) = (N − No)∇2PP(No)(N − No) ∀N ∈ Δ\{No}. (43)
This yields the following proposition.
Proposition 6. The ﬁrst-best optimal distribution of work start times is stable under the Pigouvian ﬁrst-best policy.
4.3.2. Second-best optimum
We next consider Pigouvian policy to attain the second-best optimum, which we call the Pigouvian second-best
policy.
The Pigouvian second-best policy is to introduce tax/subsidy pˆ so that Nˆo is a Nash equilibrium of the game
GˆP = {S,I, uˆP = u + pˆ}, where
pˆ = ∇2P(Nˆo)Nˆo. (44)
As stated above, this policy makes Nˆo a long-run equilibrium but cannot stabilize it. Thus, we check its stability.
For this, we consider a potential game GˆP with the potential function
PˆP(N) = P(N) + pˆ · N. (45)
Because the model of workers’ long-run decisions is viewed as the game GˆP, the second-best optimum Nˆo is stable if
and only if
(
Nˆ − Nˆo
) {∇2PˆP(Nˆo)} (Nˆ − Nˆo) = 1
2
(
Nˆ − Nˆo
) ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩∇2Wˆ(Nˆo) +
∑
k∈I
Nˆok∇2c∗k(Nˆo)
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ (Nˆ − Nˆo) < 0 ∀Nˆ ∈ Δ\{Nˆo}.
(46)
Therefore, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 7. The second-best optimum Nˆo is a stable equilibrium under the Pigouvian second-best policy if and
only if
(
Nˆ − Nˆo
) {∇2Wˆ(Nˆo)} (Nˆ − Nˆo) < (Nˆ − Nˆo)
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩−
∑
k∈I
Nˆok∇2c∗k(Nˆo)
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ (Nˆ − Nˆo) ∀Nˆ ∈ Δ\{Nˆo}; (47)
otherwise, the second-best optimum Nˆo is unstable.
Note that the condition (47) can be violated as shown in Section 4.3.3, and thus the Pigouvian second-best policy
can be ineﬀective. This means that policymakers need to implement other policies for stabilizing optimal distribution
of work start times. One of the eﬀective policy is evolutionary implementation of Pigouvian policies introduced by
Sandholm (2002, 2005b). This policy is to impose the values of externalities evaluated at the current state, rather than
the optimal state. We brieﬂy show the eﬀectiveness of this policy. If the current state is N ∈ Δ, the tax/subsidy p˜(N)
to workers is
p˜(N) = ∇2P(N)N. (48)
Let G˜P = {S,I, u˜ = u + p˜} be a population game under this policy. We then can show that the game G˜P is a potential
game for which Wˆ(N) is the potential function. This implies that the second-best optimal distribution of work start
times Nˆo must be a stable equilibrium under the policy (48) because Nˆo globally maximizes Wˆ(N).
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Fig. 5. Diﬀerences between the stable equilibrium and the optimum (N = 1.0, α = 0.2, β = 1.0)
4.3.3. A simple example revisited
To show concretely the properties of the ﬁrst-best optimum, second-best optimum, and Pigouvian policies, we
revisit the simple example presented in Section 3.2.4. In this simple case, W and Wˆ are represented as functions of
N1:
W(N1) = 2P1(N1) − P2(N1), (49a)
Wˆ(N1) = 2P1(N1) − Pˆ2(N1) (49b)
Pˆ2(N1) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
βN
4μ2
{
N2 − 3N1(N − N1)
}
if τ >
N
2μ
,
βN3
4μ2
− 2βτ
N
(
N
μ
− τ
2
)
N1(N − N1) if τ ≤ N2μ .
(49c)
Because W and Wˆ are quadratic, the ﬁrst-best and second-best optima No1 , Nˆ
o
1 are easily obtained.⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
No1 = 0,N, if
{
τ >
βN
8αμ2
and τ >
N
2μ
}
or
{
τ > N
(
1
μ
− 2α
β
)
and τ ≤ N
2μ
}
,
No1 =
N
2
if
{
τ ≤ βN
8αμ2
and τ >
N
2μ
}
or
{
τ ≤ N
(
1
μ
− 2α
β
)
and τ ≤ N
2μ
}
,
(50a)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Nˆo1 = 0,N, if
{
τ >
3βN
8αμ2
and τ >
N
2μ
}
or
{
τ > 2N
(
1
μ
− α
β
)
and τ ≤ N
2μ
}
,
Nˆo1 =
N
2
if
{
τ ≤ 3βN
8αμ2
and τ >
N
2μ
}
or
{
τ ≤ 2N
(
1
μ
− α
β
)
and τ ≤ N
2μ
}
.
(50b)
It follows from (29) and (50) that the ﬁrst-best optimal distribution of work start times is more clustered than the
stable equilibrium, and that the second-best optimum is more staggered, which is illustrated by the red areas in Figure
5. Both are consistent with Propositions 4 and 5.
These results also indicate that Nˆo1 can be equal to N
u
1 . That is, the second-best optimum can be unstable under
the Pigouvian second-best policy. Therefore, we have to carefully implement Pigouvian policies for alleviating traﬃc
congestion, such as a congestion toll, if policymakers cannot control workers’ short-run decisions.
5. Conclusions
This study presented a model of work start time choice with bottleneck congestion and an analytical approach
utilizing the properties of a potential game. By using this approach, we showed that equilibrium distribution of
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work start times is essentially non-unique and that stability of equilibria can be examined by checking the shape
of the potential function. We then showed that the capacity expansion of the bottleneck may lead to more clustered
distribution of work start times, thereby exacerbating the bottleneck congestion. Furthermore, by comparing the social
welfare function and the potential function, we clariﬁed that if policymakers can eliminate the queue at the bottleneck,
distribution of work start times should be more clustered than the stable equilibrium; otherwise, it should be more
staggered. This implies that temporal agglomeration is more important in the ﬁrst case, while congestion relief is
more important in the second. After characterizing the equilibrium and optimal distribution of work start times, we
investigated the eﬀectiveness of tax/subsidy policies and pointed out that if the queue cannot be eliminated, Pigouvian
tax/subsidy policies can be ineﬀective for achieving an optimum.
The analytical approach presented herein can be used not only for a model of work start time choice but also for
a wide class of models considering bottleneck congestion. For instance, this approach is applicable to models of
location choice with bottleneck congestion, such as Arnott (1998). Therefore, it would be valuable for future research
to investigate the intrinsic properties of other models by applying the approach.
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Appendix A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1
Let t fi and t
l
i be the fastest and latest arrival time at CBD of worker i. It follows from Proposition 1 (i.e., uniqueness
of the short-run equilibrium and the ﬁrst-in-ﬁrst-work discipline) that t fi and t
l
i satisfy
tli−1 ≤ t fi ∀i ∈ I\{1}. (A.1)
Let Ii ≡ { j | q(t) > 0 ∀t ∈ [ti, t j] or [t j, ti]}. Then, we can say that the short-run equilibrium commuting cost of
worker i is aﬀected by behavior of worker j ∈ Ii. That is,
∂c∗i (N)
∂Nj
 0 ∀ j ∈ Ii. (A.2)
Note that if there exists t ∈ [ti, t j] or [t j, ti] such that q(t) = 0, Lindsey (2004) proves that
∂c∗i (N)
∂Nj
=
∂c∗j(N)
∂Ni
= 0 ∀ j  Ii. (A.3)
Thus, for the proof of the symmetry of ∇c(N), we will show here that
∂c∗i (N)
∂Nj
=
∂c∗j(N)
∂Ni
∀ j ∈ Ii. (A.4)
The short-run equilibrium commuting cost c∗i (N) of worker i is expressed as
c∗i (N) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
s(Δt fi ) = q(t
l
i) + s(Δt
l
i) if i = ai ≡ minIi,
q(t fi ) + s(Δt
f
i ) = s(Δt
l
i) if i = bi ≡ maxIi,
q(t fi ) + s(Δt
f
i ) = q(t
l
i) + s(Δt
l
i) otherwise,
(A.5)
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where Δt fi ≡ t fi − ti and Δtli ≡ tli − ti, because q(t fai ) = q(tlbi ) = 0. This is rewritten as
c∗i (N) = q(t
f
i ) + s(Δt
f
i ) =
{
q(t fi−1) + s(Δt
f
i−1) − s(Δtli−1)
}
+ s(Δt fi ) = · · ·
=
i−1∑
k=ai
{
s(Δt fk ) − s(Δtlk)
}
+ s(Δt fi ). (A.6)
Furthermore, t fi and t
l
i are represented as functions of t
f
ai and N:
t fi = t
f
ai +
∑ j−1
k=ai
Nk
μ
, tli = t
f
ai +
∑ j
k=ai
Nk
μ
. (A.7)
Therefore, diﬀerentiating c∗i (N) with respect to Ni, we have
∂c∗i (N)
∂Nj
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∂t fai
∂Nj
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
i−1∑
k=ai
{
s′(Δt fk ) − s′(Δtlk)
}
+ s′(Δt fi )
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ + 1μ
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣−s′(Δtlj) +
i−1∑
k= j+1
{
s′(Δt fk ) − s′(Δtlk)
}
+ s′(Δt fi )
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ if i > j,
∂t fai
∂Nj
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
i−1∑
k=ai
{
s′(Δt fk ) − s′(Δtlk)
}
+ s′(Δt fi )
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ if i ≤ j,
(A.8)
where the prime denotes diﬀerentiation. In addition, it follows from q(tbi ) = 0 that∑
i∈Ii
{
s(Δt fk ) − s(Δtlk)
}
= 0. (A.9)
Diﬀerentiating both side of (A.9) with respect to Nj, we obtain
∂t fai
∂Nj
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣∑
k∈Ii
{
s′(Δt fk ) − s′(Δtlk)
}⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ + 1μ
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣−s′(Δtlj) +
bi∑
k= j+1
{
s′(Δt fk ) − s′(Δtlk)
}⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ = 0. (A.10)
Substituting this into (A.8) yields
∂c∗i (N)
∂Nj
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∂t fai
∂Ni
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
j−1∑
k=ai
{
s′(Δt fk ) − s′(Δtlk)
}
+ s′(Δt fj )
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ if i > j,
∂t fai
∂Nj
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
i−1∑
k=ai
{
s′(Δt fk ) − s′(Δtlk)
}
+ s′(Δt fi )
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ if i ≤ j,
(A.11)
which shows the symmetry of ∇c(N).
We next prove positive deﬁniteness of ∇c(N). Substituting (A.10) into (A.11), we obtain
∂c∗i (N)
∂Nj
=
∂c∗j(N)
∂Ni
= −
S fi jS
l
ji
μS i
, (A.12a)
S i ≡
∑
k∈Ii
{
s′(Δt fk ) − s′(Δtlk)
}
, (A.12b)
S fi j ≡ s′(Δt fj ) +
j−1∑
k=ai
{
s′(Δt fk ) − s′(Δtlk)
}
, S li j ≡ −s′(Δtlj) +
bi∑
k= j+1
{
s′(Δt fk ) − s′(Δtlk)
}
. (A.12c)
Note that −s′(Δtli)+ s′(Δt fi+1) < 0 for all i, i+ 1 ∈ Ii, s′(Δt fai ) < 0, and s′(Δtlbi ) > 0. It follows from this that S i, S
f
i j, S
l
i j
are all negative and that
S fi j
S li j
>
S fi( j−1)
S li( j−1)
∀i, j, j − 1 ∈ Ii. (A.13)
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Thus, (A.12a) can be rewritten as follows:
∇c(N) = LL, (A.14)
where L = (Li j)i, j∈I is a lower triangular matrix, the (i, j) entries of which are given by
Li j =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
−S lii
√√
−1
μS i
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
S fi j
S li j
−
S fi( j−1)
S li( j−1)
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎭ > 0 if i ≥ j and j, j − 1 ∈ Ii,
−S lii
√√
−1
μS i
S fi j
S li j
> 0 if i ≥ j and j ∈ Ii, j − 1  Ii,
0 otherwise.
(A.15)
This implies that ∇c(N) has a Cholesky decomposition, and thus ∇c(N) is positive semideﬁnite.8
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2
Since it is apparent that P(N) is the potential function of the game G, we prove here that the convexity of P1(N)
and P2(N).
We ﬁrst show that P1(N) is convex. The Hessian matrix of P1(N) is given by
∇2P1(N) = α {HE − τD} . (A.16)
Its inverse can be directly computed as
{
∇2P1(N)
}−1
=
1
τ
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
γ −0.5 
−0.5 1 −0.5 O
−0.5 1 −0.5
. . .
. . .
. . .
O −0.5 1 −0.5
 −0.5 γ
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, γ ≡  + 0.5,  ≡ τ
2{2H − (T − 1)τ} . (A.17)
Then, by Gershgorin circle theorem,9 every eigenvalue λ{∇2P1(N)}−1 of {∇2P1(N)}−1 lies in
0 ≤ λ{∇2P1(N)}−1 ≤ max{1 + 2, 2}. (A.18)
It follows from this that every eigenvalue of ∇2P1(N) is also nonnegative. This shows the convexity of P1(N).
P2(N) is also convex, because ∇2P2(N) = ∇c(N) is positive semideﬁnite as shown in Lemma 1.
A.3. Proof of Lemma 3
Suppose to the contrary that there exists an equilibrium N∗ in which, for some i, j ∈ supp N∗ with j− i ≥ 2, N∗k = 0
(i.e., k  supp N∗) for all i < k < j, and let di j ≡ |i − j|, N˜−k ≡
∑k
m=1 Nm, and N˜
+
k ≡
∑T
m=k Nm. Then, for k ∈ (i, j),
ui = u j ≥ uk, (A.19a)
ui − u j = τdi j
{
N˜−k − N˜+k
}
− c∗i (N) + c∗j(N) = 0, (A.19b)
ui − uk = τdik
{
N˜−k − N˜+k
}
− c∗i (N) + c∗k(N) ≥ 0, (A.19c)
8 For the proof, see, e.g., Corollary 7.2.9 of Horn and Johnson (2013).
9 For the details of this theorem, see, e.g., Strang (2006) and Horn and Johnson (2013).
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u j − uk = τdk j
{
N˜+k − N˜−k
}
− c∗j(N) + c∗k(N) ≥ 0. (A.19d)
If N˜−k ≥ N˜+k , we have c∗i (N) ≥ c∗j(N) > 0 and c∗k(N) ≥ c∗j(N) > 0 from (A.19b) and (A.19d). This implies that
q(tk) > 0, i.e., tli > tk. Furthermore, substituting (A.19b) into (A.19d) yields
u j − uk = −dikdi j c
∗
j(N) −
dk j
di j
c∗i (N) + c
∗
k(N) = −
dik
di j
s(Δt fj ) −
dk j
di j
s(Δtli) + s(t
l
i − tk). (A.20)
Since s(x) is convex, (A.20) is rewritten as
u j − uk ≤
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
dik
di j
{
−s(Δt fj ) + s(tli − tk) + τdk js′(tli − tk)
}
< 0 if tli < t j,
dik
di j
{
s(tli − tk) − s(Δt fj )
}
+
dk j
di j
{
s(tli − tk) − s(Δtli)
}
< 0 if tli ≥ t j.
(A.21)
If N˜−k < N˜
+
k , we can easily show that ui − uk < 0 by the same procedure. But this contradicts i, j ∈ supp N∗ (i.e.,
ui = u j ≥ uk).
A.4. Proof of Lemma 4
It follows from Proposition 1 (uniqueness of the short-run equilibrium and the ﬁrst-in-ﬁrst-work discipline) that
Z(N) is represented as
Z(N) =
∑
k∈I
∫ tlk
t fk
μs(t − tk)dt. (A.22)
Since t fi and t
l
i is given by (A.7), diﬀerentiation of Z(N) with respect to Ni yields
∂Z(N)
∂Ni
= s(Δtli) +
bi∑
k=i+1
{
−s(Δt fk ) + s(Δtlk)
}
+ μ
∂t fai
∂Ni
∑
k∈Ii
{
−s(Δt fk ) + s(Δtlk)
}
. (A.23)
Substituting (A.9), we have
∂Z(N)
∂Ni
=
i−1∑
k=ai
{
s(Δt fk ) − s(Δtlk)
}
+ s(Δt fi ) = c
∗
i (N). (A.24)
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